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I. INTRODUCTION
People have a tendency to act somewhat impulsively when they are
exposed to extreme situations. They lower the barriers of good manners,
and certain characteristics of their personality are intensified. This effect
can also be noted in institutions without clearly regulated decision-making
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processes, or whose outcomes depend on the decision of a handful of
people. There are not many cases where international institutions are faced
with these "extreme situations," so observers must seize the opportunity to
analyze the "personality" of institutions whenever they arise. The filing of
Artavia-Murillo et al. (In Vitro Fertilization) v. Costa Rica' was one of
these moments for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).2
This was so because this case dealt with the extremely controversial issue
of pre-natal life, a topic on which people tend to have strong personal
opinions. In fact, some IACtHR's judges previously made their personal
views explicit,3 seemingly in conflict with the text of the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).4 This case afforded a unique
opportunity to determine the extent to which the decision-making process
of the Court allows judges' personal opinions to govern the Court's
decisions.
Interestingly enough, the issue of in vitro fertilization (IVF) becomes
secondary in the Artavia judgment. Indeed, the ACHR was drafted before
the development of this technique, so the IACtHR could have decided in
favor of, or against, Costa Rica's prohibition of practicing IVF. Either
outcome would have had strengths and weaknesses. In Artavia, by contrast,
some interesting features of the IACtHR's decision-making came to the
forefront. The IACtHR's interpretation of Article 4(1) of the ACHR, and
how this provision relates to abortion, was also an interesting feature of this
case. The author's interpretation of this Article has already been developed
1. Artavia-Murillo et al. ("In Vitro Fertilization") v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Nov. 28, 2012)
[hereinafter Artavia-Murillo].
2. The Inter-American system was created within the context of the Organization of
American States (OAS). It resembles to some extent the European system of human rights in its early
years of existence, because there is a joint operation of a commission and a court of human rights. The
IACtHR was established by the 1969 ACHR as the competent organ for the protection of this treaty's
wide catalog of human rights. Applicants do not lodge their applications directly with the IACtHR, but
with the Inter-American Commission, which after a quasi-judicial procedure decides whether to file a
case with the IACtHR. In the almost more than thirty-five years of operation of the IACtHR, it has
issued nearly two hundred final judgments dealing with an extensive range of issues.
3. Ligia M. De Jesus, Post Baby Boy v. United States Developments in the Inter-American
System of Human Rights: Inconsistent Application of the American Convention's Protection of the
Right to Life from Conception, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 435, 467-69 (2011) (both the President of the
IACtHR, Diego Garcia Sayin, and then judge Margarette May Macaulay, had strongly stated their
opinions favoring abortion. Some of these positions were also made clear during the hearing of Artavia-
Murillo).
4. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
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in a different paper,s so it will not addressed again, nor will this
commentary focus on the merits of Artavia. This judgment will only be
used for analyzing "in vitro" the decision-making process of the IACtHR.
In doing so, this commentary will seek to appeal to both those who agree
and those who disagree with the actual results of Artavia.
Each feature of the IACtHR's decision-making process that this
commentary addresses deserves a study of its own. Hence, this paper can
only describe briefly the internal processes of the IACtHR. It is worth
pointing out that in spite of the criticisms that this commentary makes of
the decision-making process of the IACtHR, the author is firmly convinced
of the extraordinary potential that a regional body could have for the
application of human rights standards. Nevertheless, the author is also
convinced that flattery is of no use when it comes to strengthening
institutions. Only well-founded criticisms can help to build an Inter-
American system that is stable and respected by different regional actors.6
II. A PRELIMINARY ISSUE: DESCRIPTION OF ARTAVIA
Before going into this commentary's main theme, it is necessary to
briefly describe Artavia. The applicants challenged a decision of the
Supreme Court of Costa Rica, issued in 2000, as incompatible with the
ACHR. This domestic decision declared that an executive order regulating
5. Alvaro Pafil, Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the American Convention on
Human Rights, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 209 (2012) [hereinafter Controversial Conceptions].
6. Only twenty States are under the IACtHR's jurisdiction (out of thirty-five OAS Members).
They are mostly Latin-American countries. The most recent submissions to the IACtHR's jurisdiction
occurred in 1998. This same year one of the only two English-speaking countries under the IACtHR's
jurisdiction denounced the ACHR. William A. Schabas, Canadian Ratification of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 315, 316 (1998). William Schabas considers that
the acceptance of the ACHR in the Americas is, proportionally, much less than that of its European and
African counterparts. This situation may not improve if the IACtHR continues applying some doctrines
inconsistent with the system of checks and balances and the traditional norms of international law (e.g.,
the conventionality control, described below). These doctrines may generate mistrust among States,
especially because the IACtHR's interpretation of the ACHR entered some time ago into the region of
the legitimately disputable. This is aggravated by the lack of self-restraint in the IACtHR's
performance. This is why a judge of the IACtHR once stated that the IACtHR should be aware "that, as
an autonomous and independent entity, there is no higher authority controlling it, which means that ....
it must strictly respect the limits of this function, and remain and evolve within the sphere appropriate to
a [court]." Diaz-Peila v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 244 (Vio-Grossi, J., separate opinion) (June 26, 2012). Regarding the
lack of universality as a problem of the system, see JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 340-42 (2003). Because of all of the
foregoing, it seems that hopes for the universality of the Inter-American system (its application to all
States of the Americas) will be just chimerical, unless some practices of the IACtHR are reformed.
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IVF was unconstitutional. The Court's first reason for this ruling was that
the order breached the principle of legality because the Constitution of
Costa Rica forbids any executive regulation of the rights involved in IVF
(the right to life and the dignity of the human being). According to the
Supreme Court of Costa Rica, the Constitution considers the conceived
human being as a person who must be protected by the State and civil
society.9 The Costa Rican Supreme Court's second reason for banning this
technique was that IVF constitutes an attack on the person, because it
treated the embryo as an object, and it entails a high rate of embryonic
death.' 0 It is for this reason that the Supreme Court ruled that this technique
could not be allowed by law, "at least while its scientific development
remains at the current state and entails conscious damage to human life.""
In response to the applicants' request, the IACtHR concluded that the
Costa Rican Supreme Court's prohibition of IVF violated their rights to
personal integrity, personal liberty, privacy, and the rights of the family.12
At times it is difficult to distinguish between the statements of the IACtHR
and those that are simply given as examples taken from other international
bodies. However, the reader can be sure that Artavia stands for a number of
propositions. The IACtHR considered itself competent to adjudicate on
reproductive rights, including people's capacity to decide on the number
and spacing of their children, and to achieve the highest standard of sexual
and reproductive health.13  As to IVF and the pre-implantational embryo,
the IACtHR ruled that the latter could not be understood as a person. 14In
so holding, the IACtHR also seems to aim at preventing States from
defining the embryo as a person in their domestic legal systems. 5  The
IACtHR also ruled that the prohibition of IVF in Costa Rica lead to an
indirect discrimination against persons with disabilities (the IACtHR
7. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 2, 72.
8. Id at 72 (the IACtHR did not give enough attention to this argument).
9. Id. at 74.
10. Id. at 76.
11. Id.
12. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 381; see also ACHR, supra
note 4, at art. 1(1), 5(1), 7, 11(2), 17(2).
13. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 142-150.
14. Id. at T 256; cf at 1264.
15. This can be understood by reading Artavia-Murillo as a whole. The IACtHR held at T 264
that "the embryo cannot be understood to be a person for the purposes of Article 4(1) of the American
Convention." Reading this paragraph in isolation, the IACtHR seems to limit this statement to the
interpretation of the ACHR. However, reading Artavia-Murillo as a whole, it seems that the IACtHR
wishes to have a wider effect.
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included infertile people within this category), women, and those who have
a poor economic situation.
Artavia went beyond the analysis of IVF. It also interpreted the
relevant section of Article 4(1) ACHR, which provides: "Every person has
the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and,
in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life."1 When interpreting Article 4(1) of the ACHR, the
IACtHR used different techniques, but it failed to use them adequately.' 8
This is why, among other things, it ruled that the ACHR's use of the word
"conception," actually refers to "implantation," and that the expression "in
general" means "gradual and incremental."l9
The IACtHR ruled that the protection of the unborn is carried out
"essentially through the protection of the woman." 20  The IACtHR also
ruled that the unborn has a right to life, but that it would not be appropriate
to give it absolute protection.2 ' It considered that this would be contrary to
the protection of other human rights.22 By doing this, the IACtHR seems to
give abortion the status of a right under some circumstances, but it did not
explain when.23 Artavia rules that the right to life is not absolute, but, at the
same time, implies that other rights would enjoy this quality. In
subordinating the right to life to other less fundamental rights, the IACtHR
seems to forget that the ACHR establishes that "[e]very person has
responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind," and that "[t]he
16. Id. at 1288-304.
17. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 4(1).
18. Cf Controversial Conceptions, supra note 5.
19. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 264.
20. Id. at 222.
21. Id at 258. In light of this ruling (that the unborn has a right to life), the previous case
Xkmok Kdsek reveals its deficiency in relation to the unborn. In this case the IACtHR decided to
exclude two unborn from the number of deaths that gave rise to compensation. Xdkmok Kasek
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 214, 228 (Aug. 24, 2010).
22. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1258.
23. The IACtHR seems to give some forms of abortion the status of a right when it: states that
the protection of the unborn should be gradual and that it cannot go against other rights established in
the ACHR; quotes as being authoritative the decisions of bodies such as the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (according to which "the fundamental
principles of equality and non-discrimination require that precedence be given to protecting the rights of
pregnant women over the interest of protecting the life in formation"); and states that "[tihe Committee
has established that the total ban on abortion, as well as its criminalization under certain circumstances,
violates the provisions of the [CEDAW]." Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at %
227-28. It also points out as examples to follow the legislation of countries such as the United States
and Germany. Id at 11260-263.
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rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of
all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic
society." 24
Artavia's lack of appropriate legal techniques gives rise to many
questions and some inconsistencies. To name but one, Artavia affirms that
the implanted human being has a non-absolute right to life,25 but it later
recommends approaches in which pre-natal life is considered to be a mere
interest, instead of a right-holder.26
Having said this, it must be stressed that the IACtHR is free to modify
each and every one of Artavia's rulings. This is so because the IACtHR
does not operate within a system of binding precedent. The IACtHR tends
to support its decisions by referring to its previous judgments, but the
principle of stare decisis has no standing in the IACtHR's practice. Indeed,
the jurisprudence of the IACtHR has only been consistent in some areas,27
yet changing or erratic in others.28 Furthermore, except for some isolated
24. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 32 (under the heading "Relationship between Duties and
Rights." The IACtHR's case law seems to have consigned this provision to oblivion).
25. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at T 258.
26. Id. at T 260.
27. E.g., in the area of amnesty laws. See Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Le Bannissement de
17mpunitd: D&ryptage de la Politique Jurisprudentielle de la Cour Interamiricaine des Droits de
l'Homme [The Banishment of Impunity: Decipherment of the Case Law Policy of the Inter-American
Court], 89 REV. TRIM. DR. H. 5-10, 3-42 (2012); see generally Wayne Sandholtz and John McCone,
Juggling Rights, Juggling Politics: Amnest Laws and the Inter-American Court, available at
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/52 11 d97f-
650e-4bfd-b352-05f6a013929b.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (in the area of amnesty laws).
28. See, e.g., Ezequiel Malarino, Activismo Judicial, Punitivizacidn y Nacionalizaci6n.
Tendencias Antidemocrdticas y Antiliberales de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,
[Judicial Activism, Punitivitivism and Nationalization. Anti Democratic and Anti Liberal Tendencies of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights] SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCi6N DE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 25, 41, n.38 (2010) (In relation to the
prohibition to apply the statute of limitations to certain crimes) [hereinafter Judicial Activism]; see also
Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, International and Domestic Law: Definitely an Odd Couple, 77 REv. JUR.
U.P.R. 483, 485-88 (2008) (in relation to the self-executing character (direct effect) of the ACHR); see
also Karlos A. Castilla Juirez, i Control Interno o Difuso de Convencionalidad? Una Mejor Idea: La
Garantia de Tratados [Internal or Diffuse Conventionality Control? A Better Idea: The Guarantee of
Treaties], XIII AN. MEX. DD.HH. 51, 56-68 (2013) (in relation to the connected issue of the
conventionality control doctrine, also called control ofconformity with the Convention); see also Alvaro
Pail Diaz, Giro En Materia de Recurso de Revisi6n Ante La Corte Interamericana [Twist on the
Remedy of Revision Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], 4 REv. CHIL. DER. Y CIENCIA
POL. 131 (2013) (in relation to its acceptance of the revision remedy). In a similar vein, Judge Vio-
Grossi alleges in his dissenting opinion that Artavia-Murillo is not consistent with the IACtHR's
previous interpretation of the right to life. Some other changes could be called a development of the
IACtHR's case law. See e.g., Art. 55 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-20/09, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 20, (Sept. 29, 2009) (in relation to the use of ad hoc judges
[Vol. 21:1
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examples, the IACtHR tends to be unapologetic when departing from its
previous decisions, thereby showing that it does not consider itself obliged
to follow its previous judgments.2 9 The only way in which prior decisions
of the IACtHR could have some real importance for subsequent cases,
would be according to the civil law concept of jurisprudence constante, to
which the IACtHR often refers.30 However, even the IACtHR's use of this
system could be contested. 3 1 Be that as it may, a single decision creates no
judicial pattern, so not even jurisprudence constante can be invoked in
relation to pre-natal life.
The IACtHR ordered many remedies, among which were the
following:
a) annulling the prohibition of IVF;32
b) providing for implementing IVF, establishing "systems for the
inspection and quality control of the qualified professionals and
institutions that perform this type of assisted reproduction
technique;" 33
c) making IVF gradually available as an infertility treatment or
program at the Costa Rican Social Security Institute, "in
and the participation of national judges); see also, cf the IACtHR's current approach in relation to
military jurisdiction and to the possibility of violating the ACHR by the sheer enacting of a particular
statute (regardless of its application), with that of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30 (Jan. 29, 1997) if 82-84, 91, 92; see also Genie-
Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Application for Judicial Review of the Judgment of Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 45, T 10 (Cangado-Trindade, J., dissenting) (Sept.
13, 1997).
29. Of the examples given in the previous footnote, only the change affecting the use of ad-
hoc and national judges was explained by the IACtHR. This change was so noticeable, that the IACtHR
could not have done otherwise.
30. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic
Analysis, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006) (in relation to the distinction between stare decisis and
jurisprudence constante); see also A. L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, L.Q.
REv. 40 (1934). An example of the use of the concept "jurisprudence constante" is given by the
"concurring opinion" of Gutidrrez-Soler v. Colombia, which argues against the reasoning in the
dissenting opinion by making several references to the constant jurisprudence of the IACtHR (this
opinion was given the name "concurring opinion," in spite of the fact that it was signed by all the judges
who voted in favor of the majority's decision). Gutidrrez-Soler v. Colombia, Provisional Measures,
Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (June 30, 2011).
31. The IACtHR's practice seems to reveal that references to previous judgments are only
illustrative. It is safe to say that the IACtHR considers its previous judgments to be more authoritative
than those issued by courts of other jurisdictions (such as those of the ECtHR). Nevertheless, this
authority cannot be equated with binding power.
32. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1336.
33. Id. at1337.
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accordance with the obligation to respect and guarantee the
principle of non-discrimination;" 34 and
d) implementing "permanent education and training programs
and courses on human rights, reproductive rights and non-
discrimination . . . for judicial employees in all areas and at all
echelons of the Judiciary."35
The judgment has both a concurring and a dissenting opinion. Judge
Garcia-Sayin is the author of the concurring opinion with which Judge
Abreu-Blondet adhered.36 This concurrence simply restates the judgment's
ruling, but dwells somewhat more on the gradual implementation of Costa
Rica's obligation to include IVF treatments within its health system.3 ' The
dissenting opinion was issued by Judge Vio-Grossi, who strongly criticized
the majority's decision.38
It is not possible to refer to all of the various arguments of the
dissenting opinion, so this commentary will focus on only a few. Judge
Vio-Grossi begins his opinion by reiterating a previous criticism that is not
particularly relevant to this commentary.39 Vio-Grossi then criticizes the
perspective from which Artavia was addressed. This perspective would
have ended up relegating Article 4(1)-the right to life-to a secondary
position in relation to the other rights involved in the case. The dissenting
opinion also complained that, in practice, the IACtHR ends up affirming
that the expression "in general" means "exceptionally," which is clearly
against the text of the ACHR.40
Vio-Grossi also criticized the mistakes of the majority when
interpreting Article 4(1) in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
34. Id. at 1338.
35. Id. at 341 (these programs must make special mention of the Artavia decision).
36. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Garcia-Say~in, J., concurring).
37. See id.
38. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Vio-Grossi, J., dissenting).
39. Vio-Grossi complains that judges of the IACtHR had tried in previous cases to use their
concurring opinions as a way of censoring and silencing the minority's opinions. See generally Eduardo
Vio-Grossi, Constancia de Queja, con Relacidn a Parte del Voto Concurrente Conjunto Emitido con
Ocasidn de las Resoluciones "Medidas Provisionales Respecto de la Repdblica de Colombia, Caso
Gutidrrez Soler Vs. Colombia", "Medidas Provisionales Respecto de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
Caso Rosendo Cantu y Otra Vs. Mdxico", y "Medidas Provisionales Respecto de la Repdblica de
Honduras, Caso Kawas Ferndndez Vs. Honduras" [Complaint Regarding a Section of the Concurring
opinion in the Case of the Resolution "Provisional Measures in Regards to the Colombian Republic,
Case Gutierrez Soler v. Colombia ", "Provisional Measures in regards to the United States of Mexico,
Case Rosendo Cantd v. Mexico", and "Provisional Measures in Regards to the Republic of Honduras
Caso Kawas Ferndndez Vs. Honduras'] (2010) (on file with author).
40. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Vio-Grossi, J., dissenting).
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Treaties (VCLT):'4  He criticizes the use of international instruments and
domestic laws of non-member States as if they were the "context" of the
ACHR, on the basis that they lack the features necessary to constitute
context of the ACHR.4 2 Vio-Grossi also referred to the step backwards that
was made by the IACtHR's jurisprudence in relation to the right to life.43
The IACtHR formerly ruled that the right to life was a requirement for the
enjoyment of all other rights, so that restrictive interpretations of it were
inadmissible." In Artavia, by contrast, while recognizing that the
implanted human being has a right to life, the IACtHR held that such right
could be subject to a proportionality test where it is balanced with other
rights.45
The dissenting opinion also criticized the IACtHR's ruling that the
protection of unborn children must be essentially implemented through the
protection of their mothers.4 6 Such an interpretation leaves the unborn
unprotected, intertwining their fate to their mothers' decision. Such an
interpretation strays very far from the purpose of the ACHR which
specifically sought to address the issue of abortion.4 7 Judge Vio-Grossi also
stated that the IACtHR lacked good faith in its evolutive interpretation of
the ACHR because it sought to suppress the effect of one of the provisions
of this treaty.48  Vio-Grossi's opinion ends by stating that the IACtHR
stepped into the realm of rule-making, a function that belongs exclusively
to the States. In doing so, the IACtHR distorted its judicial mission, so
Vio-Grossi urged States "to exercise their normative function in the way
they deem best.""9
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Vio-Grossi, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Cf, in addition to the dissenting opinion's argument, it must be taken into account that
during the discussion of the ACHR's wording, the framers considered including a specific social right
granting special protection to pregnant women. This would have been redundant if the end of Art. 4(1)
would have been to protect women. The provision granting special protection to expectant mothers-as
happened with all other social rights-was not included in the final draft of the ACHR. Inter-American
Yearbook on Human Rights (1968), General Secretariat of the Organization of American States
(Washington D.C. 1973).
48. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Vio-Grossi, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
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III. EXTRA-CONVENTION JURISDICTION
A study dealing with the decision-making process of the IACtHR
should firstly refer to the extent of this court's jurisdiction. On several
occasions the IACtHR has claimed to have jurisdiction over some treaties
other than the ACHR. According to the IACtHR, these treaties became part
of the human rights corpus juris.50 Some of these claims are correct,
because a number of Inter-American treaties, such as the Protocol of San
Salvador, explicitly give jurisdiction to the IACtHR over certain rights."
This extra-Convention jurisdiction, however, goes further than this as stated
by then ad-hoc Judge Ferrer-Mac-Gregor-currently a sitting judge. He
also stated, in relation to the conventionality control, 52 that the IACtHR
may interpret "the American Convention, its additional Protocols, and other
international instruments of the same nature that are integrated in said Inter-
American corpus juris," those of which are within the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court.53 This section will show the IACtHR's broad
understanding of human rights treaties that are supposedly part of the Inter-
American corpus juris, and will refer to some effects of adjudicating on
them.
50. See e.g., Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232, $ 107 (Aug. 31, 2011) (the IACtHR refers to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child as comprising the corpus juris of children's rights); see also The Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the due Process of Law,
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, 1 115 (Oct. 1, 1999) (where the
IACtHR defines corpus juris); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export and Regional Consent in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101, 114 (2008) (where Neuman states:
"This notion of an ever-expanding 'corpus juris' of binding and non-binding norms available for
consideration in the regulation of states underlies much of the Court's practice in interpreting the
ACHR." Neuman is also concerned by the IACtHR's use of non-binding instruments.). Id at 114-16.
51. See Gonzdlez et al. v. Mexico ("Cotton Field"), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 1 45-48 (Nov. 16, 2009)
(where the IACtHR explained in detail the extent of its jurisdiction over the different treaties of the
Inter-American system) [hereinafter Gonzdlez].
52. This paper refers in more detail to the "conventionality control" in a footnote in the section
dealing with the IACtHR's maximalist approach. In Spanish, the expression "control de
convencionalidad" tries to emulate the expression "control de constitucionalidad' (constitutional
review). In the abovementioned quote of Ferrer-Mac-Gregor, the conventionality control is given a
different name. See Alvaro Pa6l, Translation Challenges of the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights
and Cost-Effective Proposals for Improvement, 5 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. / REV. INTERAM. Y
EUR. DD.HH. 3, 10-11 (2012) (on the different translations of this concept) [hereinafter Translation].
53. Cabrera-Garcia & Montiel-Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, 1 48 (Nov. 26, 2010) (Ferrer-Mac-Gregor-
Poisot, J., concurring).
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There are different ways of asserting jurisdiction in order to apply
international treaties other than the ACHR. The IACtHR may explicitly
declare the direct violation of specific Articles of some treaties, as it has
done with those of the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons.54 There is also an indirect way of asserting
extra-Convention jurisdiction, by defining various concepts of the ACHR
according to the legal definitions of other treaties. In some cases, it is
important to interpret certain international obligations by taking into
consideration what the different conventions provide for. The problem
arises, however, when other treaties are used without further questioning, as
if they were directly applicable by the IACtHR; or, as if the differences in
wording and the existence of specialized bodies applying them (or the
intentional lack thereof) were somewhat irrelevant.
The IACtHR has ruled that it cannot adjudicate a treaty that has been
signed but not yet ratified.ss Among ratified instruments, the IACtHR has
applied treaties with both a generalized acceptance in the Americas, and
others with less widespread approval. Among the former, the IACtHR has
referred, on some occasions, to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations which has been ratified by all States in the continent.
Something similar can be said of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child57 and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 29.
54. G6mez-Palomino v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 136, 1 162(5) (Nov. 22, 2005).
55. See Baena et al. v. Panama, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 72, % 95-99 (Feb. 2, 2001) (when providing the aforementioned, the IACtHR went against
the request made by the Inter-American Commission. Nevertheless, it reminded that Art. 26 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties requires States to abstain from committing acts against the object
and purpose of a treaty that has been signed. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 26 (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter VCLTI).
56. V6lez-Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 158 (Nov. 23, 2010).
57. Villagrin-Morales et al. v. Guatemala (Street Children), Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, 194-95 (Nov. 19, 1999) (the IACtHR ruled:
Both the American Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
form part of a very comprehensive international corpus juris for the protection of
the child that should help this Court establish the content and scope of the general
provision established in Article 19 of the American Convention.)
[hereinafter Street Children]; see also Street Children, at 1 195 (where the IACtHR quotes verbatim
some Articles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
58. See Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, 156-57 (July 1, 2006) (where the IACtHR
used the International Labour Organization Convention 29, regarding forced labor, to interpret the
ACHR's article concerning freedom from slavery).
98 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law [Vol. 21:1
In Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, the IACtHR relied on treaties
pertaining to violence and discrimination against women, which had been
ratified by Peru and the majority of the Organization of American States
(OAS), at least by the time of the judgment. 59 The IACtHR used these
treaties regarding women as a reference for interpreting the scope of
Article 5 of the ACHR regarding the right to humane treatment.60  The
IACtHR also ruled that they would "complement" the corpus juris in
relation to the international protection of women.61
A significant problem in interpreting provisions of the ACHR by
reference to other treaties, is that the IACtHR incorporates these
interpretations into its case law, and may then apply them to other States
that have not yet ratified the relevant treaties. The Court performed such a
maneuver in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, where the
IACtHR used the ILO Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and
Tribal PeopleS62 for determining the extent of Article 21 of the ACHR (the
right to property). Paraguay had ratified this treaty by the time of the
judgment, but this was not the case for the majority of OAS Members.64
The IACtHR, however, later applied this same interpretation to Suriname,
which is not party to ILO Convention 169.5 In doing so, it extended, in a
rather creative way, the obligations emanating from an international
59. Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, T 276 (Nov. 25, 2006). The treaties that were taken into consideration were
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women "Convention of Belem do Para," and United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women. The first treaty had not been enacted by the time of the facts,
but it was by the time of the judgment, when most OAS members had ratified it (except for Canada and
the United States). See O.A.S., Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women "Convention of Belem do Para", June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
The second treaty had been ratified by the overwhelming majority of OAS members by the time of the
facts. See also U.N., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Jan. 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 (the United States was the sole State that had not ratified by the time of the
judgment).
60. Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, at 276.
61. Id.
62. International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, Sep. 5,
1991, I.L.O. No. 169.
63. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, $ 127-30 (June 17, 2005).
64. Normilex, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, (July 26, 2013),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p-1000: 1 1300:0::NO: 11300:P1 1300_INSTRUMENTID:312314
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
65. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, 192-93 (Nov. 28, 2007).
instrument. 6 This argument of the IACtHR's seems to be an a priori
reasoning.
The IACtHR has also considered the State responsible for non-
compliance with standards taken from non-binding instruments. For
instance, in Fleury v. Haiti, the IACtHR explicitly declared that the State
violated the ACHR's right to humane treatment because "the detention
conditions endured by Mr. Fleury did not meet the minimum standards of
detention required by the international instruments" (alluding to the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).6 7
Extra-Convention jurisdiction is visible at several points in Artavia,
such as when developing the rights of persons with disabilities. The
ACHR makes no mention of special rights of people with disabilities. 69
The sole bases on which the IACtHR could have claimed authority to
decide on issues related to disability are the provisions forbidding
discrimination. 70  Thus, Artavia looked for further bases in the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, an Article of the
"Protocol of San Salvador" (which is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
IACtHR),71 and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (which makes
no reference to the individual petition system of the IACtHR).72 Based on
the aforementioned provisions, the IACtHR ruled "States are obliged to
facilitate the inclusion of persons with disabilities by means of equality of
conditions, opportunities and participation in all spheres of society, in order
to guarantee that the said limitations are dismantled." 73 It also ruled "that
persons with infertility in Costa Rica, faced with the barriers created by the
Constitutional Chamber's decision, should consider that they are protected
by the rights of persons with disabilities, which include the right to have
access to the necessary techniques to resolve reproductive health
66. Id.
67. Fleury (Lysias) et al. v. Haiti, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 236, 1 85-87 (Nov. 23, 2011).
68. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 286-93.
69. See generally ACHR, supra note 4.
70. Not even this approach would be simple. In fact, considering the terms used in Arts. 1 and
24 ACHR, this matter would require more of an in-depth analysis.
71. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Additional
Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador,"
Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, art. 19(6).
72. See Gonzdlez supra note 62, at T 46.
73. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1 292.
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problems."74 These statements blatantly go beyond a simple prohibition of
discrimination. The IACtHR took a similar approach when ruling on
reproductive rights.7 5
It was in its first advisory opinion that the IACtHR, based on the broad
powers that the ACHR grants the IACtHR in consultative matters, ruled
that it could interpret provisions alien to the ACHR when issuing advisory
opinions.76 However, the IACtHR has extended these broad interpretive
powers to its contentious jurisdiction.7 7  It did so in spite of the ACHR's
narrower framing of this kind of jurisdiction. The IACtHR bases its
application of other treaties partly on Article 29 of the ACHR.78 In broad
terms, this provision states that the ACHR shall not be used for restricting
other rights recognized by the State. Using Article 29 for claiming extra-
Convention jurisdiction is, however, contestable.79  The reasons why
require an in-depth analysis impossible in this commentary.80 Suffice it to
74. Id. at T 293.
75. Id. at 1 144, 161, 277, 288.
76. Other treaties subject to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.1 (Sept. 24,
1982).
77. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, 1161 (June 27, 2012).
78. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, at TT
125-30; see also Contreras et al., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232, at T 112 (this idea is also clear in
some separate opinions, such as, concurring opinion of Judge ad hoc Eduardo Ferrer-Mac-Gregor-Poisot
in Sudrez-Peralta v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261, T 6 (May 21, 2013) (Eduardo Ferrer-Mac-Gregor-Poisot, J. concurring));
see also M.P.C. & Family Members v. Peru, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 149/10, Petition
1147-05,129 (2010) (where the Inter-American Commission applies a similar reasoning).
79. For instance, not applying Convention 169 is not tantamount to using the ACHR for
restricting other rights. Convention 169 would still bind Paraguay in the relevant fora, even if the
IACtHR does not use it for adjudicating. Nevertheless, the IACtHR's view is shared by many scholars.
See, e.g., Cecilia Medina Quiroga & Claudio Nash Rojas, Sistema Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos: Introduccidn a Sus Mecanismos de Proteccidn, [Inter-American System of Human Rights:
Introduction to its Protection Mechanism] Centro de Derechos Humanos, 82-83 (2007).
80. The main issue that must be determined is whether the "restrictions regarding
interpretation" (heading of Article 29) are supposed to be applied by States in their domestic
proceedings or also by the IACtHR in contentious proceedings. In this regard, it must be borne in mind
that:
1) The State is the first interpreter of the ACHR (the IACtHR interprets it only
once cases are lodged before it, whereas States must interpret it in relation to
specific cases and in areas that have not yet been addressed by the IACtHR);
2) Art. 29(a) refers to some kind of prohibition of abuse of rights (similar to that
of Art. 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights), which establishes
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say that it goes against the spirit of the ACHR to hold that Article 29 gives
the IACtHR jurisdiction for applying more favorable treaties. If this
provision is interpreted as granting extra powers to the IACtHR, it could
also be argued that the IACtHR has the jurisdiction to issue judgments on
"other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or
derived from representative democracy as a form of government" (also
referred to in Article 29).81 This would give the LACtHR an absolute law-
making power in the area of human rights, rendering useless the long
discussions that took place when determining the specific wording of the
rights enshrined in the ACHR. Indeed, the framers of the ACHR "went to
considerable effort[s] to negotiate and adopt their own regional human
rights treaty. They did not reduce the treaty to a local enforcement
mechanism for the global Covenants."8 2 In addition, such interpretation
would be in stark opposition to Article 31, which establishes that other
rights and freedoms can be included in the protection system of the ACHR
by following the amendment procedures established in this very treaty."
The legitimacy and power of a court are not based on its judges'
knowledge, expertise or originality, which may ultimately be surpassed by
those of an expert council of university professors. Legitimacy and power
stem mainly from the mandate that States have given a court for
interpreting specific international instruments. These powers are explicitly
prohibitions to any "group, or person," toward which only the State has
jurisdiction;
3) Art. 29(b) forbids using the ACHR for "restricting the enjoyment or exercise of
any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party." So, if it
is understood that the IACtHR should apply Art. 29, the aforementioned
provision would end up giving the IACtHR jurisdiction for judging on domestic
laws (preliminary drafts of the ACHR not only referred to "laws," but also to
"customs");
4) The prohibition on excluding "other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the
human personality" would grant the IACtHR an unlimited and unrestricted
power;
5) Art. 29 is not located in "Part II-Means of Protection," the section that
regulates the IACtHR and its power, but in "Part I-State Obligations and Rights
Protected" (but not within the chapter regulating rights and freedoms under the
IACtHR's jurisdiction); and
6) The heading of Art. 29 is "Restrictions Regarding Interpretation" (the Spanish
version is "Normas de Interpretaci6n" [Rules of Interpretation]), and if Art. 29 is
read as giving extra-Convention jurisdiction to the IACtHR, it would not be a
restriction, but an extension of its interpretive powers. ACHR, supra note 4, at
art. 29(a) & (b).
81. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 29(c).
82. Neuman, supra note 50, at 115.
83. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 31.
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established in the treaties that give jurisdiction to courts. Hence, if judges
start applying treaties over which they have no jurisdiction according to
their courts' founding instruments, they will be distancing themselves from
the source of the power that was given to them. They would be
undermining their legitimacy.
When it is only one judge who fails to limit him or herself to applying
only the treaties for which his or her court has jurisdiction, States have the
easy option of not re-electing him or her for a further period. By contrast,
when an entire international court distances itself from its source of
legitimacy, States are not left with many options. They may accept these
new powers arrogated by the court, modify the procedural and interpretive
rules of the court, or, simply denounce the treaty that gave the court its
powers. In other words, if international courts arrogate to themselves
jurisdiction over treaties other than those over which they have explicit
competence-regardless of whether these treaties have been ratified by the
State against which they are applied-they will be taking a path that may
have extremely serious consequences for the system as a whole. These
assertions are better understood in light of the criticisms of the IACtHR
generated by Artavia in Chile, the author's home country. These criticisms
were even stronger than those formulated in some cases against Chile
itself.8 4
IV. MAXIMALIST APPROACH
A court dealing with human rights cases may take a more minimalist
or maximalist approach to adjudication.8 ' An international human rights
court that took a minimalist approach would refer only to the main issue of
a case, abstaining from additional comments, even if they were relevant for
84. See e.g., Juan Ignacio Brito, Los Nuevos Jacobinos [The New Jacobins], LA TERCERA
(Jan. 3, 2013), at 46, available at http://diario.latercera.com/2013/01/03/01/contenido/opinion/l11-
126743-9-los-nuevos-jacobinos.shtmI (last visited Oct. 17, 2014); see also Hernin Corral Talciani,
Corte Interamericana y derecho a la vida del concebido [Inter-American Court and the Conceived's
Right to Life], EL MERCURIO, Dec. 29, 2012, at A2; see also Max Silva Abott, Jurisdiccidn de Corte
Interamericana [Jurisdiciton ofthe Inter-American Court], EL MERCURIO, Jan. 4, 2013, at A2. After
these criticisms, Judge Vio-Grossi granted an interview to El Mercurio newspaper. See Matias Bakit R,
Eduardo Vio-Grossi, eljuez chileno en la CIDH: La Corte interpreta y avanza mas alla de lo que los
estados quieren [Eduardo Vio-Grossi, The IACtHR Chilean Judge: The Court Interprets and Advances
Further than what the States Want], EL MERCURIO, Jan. 13, 2013, at D21 (Judge Vio-Grossi's interview
to El Mercurio newspaper).
85. Cass Sunstein refers to such a distinction, but he does not apply it to courts' fact-finding.
This paper's account will make some reference to Sunstein's theory, but does not try to mirror it. In
fact, this paper calls minimalism what may be considered subminimalism in Sunstein's theory. See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 25 (First
Harvard University Press paperback edition, 2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN].
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the present or future cases. 6  At the opposite extreme there is the
maximalist approach, both regarding facts and law.87 A court with this
approach will try to refer to each of the applicant's arguments, aiming to
establish what happened in relation to each one of the unclear facts of a
case. Such a court will also try to establish many abstract rules. Of course,
no court will necessarily always be, and in every respect, minimalist or
maximalist. There are, however, some courts that display tendencies in one
way or the other.
Between the minimalist and maximalist approach there is a moderate
position. A court adopting this position will aim at referring exclusively to
a case's core issues and the closely connected ones. It will establish only
rules that are applicable to the current case and to future identical cases. An
international court that is aware of its limitations will take this position.
Such a court acknowledges the difficulty in establishing the truth of what
happened in a particular case, due to its temporal and spatial distance from
the time and place where the facts occurred, and probably also because of
the insufficiency of its financial resources. This approach is consistent with
the principle of subsidiarity, which will be described below.
The IACtHR finds itself within the courts that have a maximalist
approach. Some manifestations of this position are its attempts to
determine even the most minimal details of the facts that are related to the
18
applicants' claims, its custom of expanding the reach of its case law by
issuing extensive judgments,8 9 and its enunciation of many abstract general
principles.90
86. Cass Sunstein considers that minimalists seek to rule narrowly rather than broadly. In a
single case, they do not wish to resolve other, related problems that might have relevant differences.
They are willing to live with the costs and burdens of uncertainty, which they tend to prefer to the risks
of premature resolution of difficult issues. Sunstein also considered the U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice Rehnquist to be an example of minimalism. Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply,
104 MICH. L. REV. 123, (2005) [hereinafter Testing Minimalism]; see also Robert Anderson IV,
Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1045 (2009).
87. Sunstein understands maximalists to be "those who seek to decide cases in a way that sets
broad rules for the future and that also gives ambitious theoretical justifications for outcomes."
SUNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 9-11 (where U.S. Justices Scalia and Thomas are said to be maximalists in
relation to the setting down of broad rules).
88. See Alvaro Paid, In Search of the Standards of Proof Applied by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 55 REV. I.I.D.H. 57, 79-81 (2012) (The IACtHR has even referred to the personality
of the alleged victims within the "proven facts." Many of these facts are not necessary for solving a
case, and they are sometimes proven with a "minimal" standard of proof.).
89. E g., the facts of the Barrios Altos case dealt only with a self-amnesty law issued in Peru,
but the IACtHR's decision also referred other kinds of amnesties, statutes of limitation, and "the
establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility." Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits,
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A concrete example is the IACtHR's response to States'
acknowledgements of responsibility. While the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) tends to close a case as soon as it receives an
acknowledgement of responsibility, the IACtHR tries to issue, nevertheless,
a detailed account of the actual facts that gave rise to the case. There are
several reasons that could justify this attitude, for instance, the restorative
effect that these declarations could have for the victim.9' There is,
however, an important problem with the IACtHR's stance on
acknowledgements of responsibility. This lies in the fact that it is very
difficult to reach a detailed account of the actual facts of a case when the
State decides not to oppose the version of the facts that is alleged by the
applicants, because there will be no real adversarial proceedings. This
difficulty is enhanced by some practices of the IACtHR. First, where the
respondent State concedes the applicant's factual allegations, the IACtHR
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 41 (Mar. 14, 2001). Some critics and supporters of the
IACtHR's rulings agree that this led to an application of Barrios Altos' ruling to situations that were
inappropriate, resulting in a violation of the ultima ratio principle of criminal law. See Daniel R. Pastor,
La Deriva Neopunitivista de Organismos y Activistas coma Causa del Desprestigio Actual de los
Derechos Humanos [The Neopunitivist Drift of Agencies and Activists as a Cause of the Current
Discredit of Human Rights], 73 A Nueva Doctrina Penal, 83-85 (2005); see also Leonardo Filippini, El
Prestigio de Los Derechos Humanos. Respuesta a Daniel Pastor [The Prestige of Human Rights.
Answer to Daniel Pastor], 3 Jura Gentium, section 3.1 (2007), available at
http://www.juragentium.org/topics/latina/es/filippin.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
90. See e.g., Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, 39 (Mar. 1, 2005) ("principle of the historical truth"); see also
Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
151, 92 (Sept. 19, 2006) ("principle of maximum disclosure"); see also Rochela Massacre v.
Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163, 196 (May
11, 2007) (principle of "proportionality of punishment"); see also Barreto-Leiva v. Venezuela, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 206, 47, 55 (Nov. 17, 2009)
("principle of congruence" and "principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia"); see also
V6lez-Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 208 (Nov. 23, 2010) ("principle of separation" in prisons). The IACtHR also
requires the fulfilment of some principles when granting reparations. E.g., Suirez-Peralta v. Ecuador,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261,
152 (May 21, 2013) ("[T]he State's supervision and inspection should be designed to ensure the
principles of availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of the medical services"). In addition,
the IACtHR has considered that many rights fall within the jus cogens category. See also Ricardo
Abello-Galvis, La Jerarquia Normativa en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Evolucidn
Jurisprudencial del Jus Cogens [Normative Hierarchy Before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Evolution of Jus Cogens in the Court's Case Law] (1993-2012), 12 REV. INST. BRASIL.
DIREITOS HuM. 357 (2012). This readiness to declare rights asjus cogens has been criticized by some
authors. See Neuman, supra note 50, at 118-22.
91. For some of the pros and cons of responsibility acknowledgments, see James L. Cavallaro
& Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century:
The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 768, 808-16 (2008).
requires only a low standard of proof.92 Second, once the State has
accepted an allegation, the IACtHR refuses to admit evidence aimed at
undermining it. 3 Third, once the State has acknowledged its responsibility,
the IACtHR has accepted further claims by the applicant, without giving the
State as full an opportunity to respond to these new allegations as it would
have had for the original allegations.9 4 Due to this lack of an adversarial
process, it is not surprising that the IACtHR has made mistakes. This
happened in the case of the "Mapiripdn Massacre."" There, the IACtHR
named some people who had been allegedly killed in a massacre, but it then
transpired that some of them were alive or had died in different
circumstances. 6
The IACtHR's maximalism is evident in Artavia. The first example is
that the applicants only referred to IVF, but the IACtHR went beyond that,
addressing the issue of pre-natal life and abortion. A second example is
the IACtHR's analysis of the facts of the case which gave a very detailed
account of the personal situation of each one of the alleged victims.
Finally, the IACtHR referred to several abstract concepts97 and general
principles. The extent of these concepts and principles will probably need
to be qualified in the future, as has happened with other issues, such as the
impossibility of applying a statute of limitations to human rights
violations.99 This is due to the inherent difficulty that exists in drawing
broad general principles.
In some maximalist decisions, such as Artavia, there are often
abundant declarations, examples, and references to international bodies.
This makes it more difficult to know if some statements form part of the
ratio decidendi or of the obiter dicta of the case. This distinction is
fundamental for a court aspiring to have its precedents applied by domestic
State bodies, as the IACtHR claims with its doctrine of the control of
92. See Pail, supra note 88, at 94-95.
93. Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 100, 1 59 (Sept. 18, 2003).
94. Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, 1$ 58-60 (Oct. 25, 2012).
95. "Mapiripin Massacre" v. Colombia, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the
Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 23, 2012).
96. Id.
97. E.g., Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1 311 (the IACtHR agrees
with the biomedical perspective of expert witness Zegers-Hochschild).
98. E.g., id. at 1 256, 286 ("Principle of gradual and incremental-rather than absolute-
protection of prenatal life", or the "principle of the peremptory right to equal and effective protection of
the law and non-discrimination.").
99. Activismo Judicial, supra note 28, at 41 n.38.
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conventionality or control of conformity with the Convention.100 At times it
is hard to determine whether the IACtHR is adopting statements of other
bodies that are quoted within the judgment as its own.
A maximalist court that tries to analyze in detail each and every one of
the facts and juridical arguments alleged by the parties will end up
spreading itself too thin. It will probably not be able to address all of the
matters and arguments raised by the parties. In the case of the IACtHR, its
desire to address even the minuscule facts of a case has, more than once,
co-existed with the IACtHR's dismissal of some important claims.10 This
ends up creating suspicion among those whose claims are not addressed. In
Artavia, for instance, one of the petitioners requested the IACtHR declare a
violation of the alleged victims' rights established in Article 4(1) ACHR. 10 2
The IACtHR, however, did not refer to this, in spite of its importance.
Another example is that the IACtHR explicitly decided not to address some
of the State's claims regarding the negative effects of IVF,os arguing that
the decision would be limited to controversies that had been addressed by
the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court.'0 This was
100. The IACtHR's unconventional doctrine of the control of conventionality requires domestic
courts and all other domestic public bodies to apply the ACHR and the IACtHR's interpretations of it,
even when they are clearly against some domestic laws, including the constitution. This doctrine is
highly contestable and would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply in practice. For a favorable view
of this doctrine, see Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga, The Conventionality Control: Examples of
(Un)Successful Experiences in Latin America, 3 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. / REV. INTERAM. Y
EUR. DD.HH. 200, 200-19 (2010). For a critical view of it, see Castilla Juirez, supra note 38, at 51-
97;,see also Ezequiel Malarino, Acerca de la Pretendida Obligatoriedad de la Jurisprudencia de los
6
rganos Interamericanos de Proteccidn de Derechos Humanos para los Tribunales Judiciales
Nacionales [In the Matter of the Alleged Mandatory Jurispurdence of the Inter-American Agencies for
the Protection of Human Rights and the National Court], in SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE
PROTECCI6N DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 435, 25-61 (Christian
Steiner ed., 2011). Similarly, some highest courts of member States also have critical views of the
IACtHR's doctrine of the control of conformity with the Convention, see Suprema Corte de Justicia
[SCJ] [Supreme Court of Justice] 22/2/2013, Judgment No. 20, IUE 2-109971/2011, (Urm.) (Dec. 24,
2013), available at http://medios.elpais.com.uy/downloads/2013/sentenciascj.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,
2014).
101. An example of this can be seen in Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga, The American Convention
and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties: Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 185 (2013) [hereinafter
Two Intertwined Treaties].
102. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 7.
103. E.g., the effects in the health of women and their children, in the legal system, and when
cryoconserving embryos. Id. at 134-35.
104. Id. at y 134-35 (the IACtHR based this decision on an alleged requirement of the
subsidiarity principle. This statement of the IACtHR is obscure, because this court tends to limit the
discussion only in relation to the facts that are alleged, but not in relation to the arguments raised by the
done in spite of the direct relation existing between these allegations and
the State's prohibition of IVF. Something similar happened with the
IACtHR's decision not to address the State's petition to grant a margin of
appreciation. 05 In these latter two cases, the IACtHR's way of proceeding
not only excluded some arguments-which contrasts with the IACtHR's
maximalist approach-but also limited the State's possibility to defend
itself. This is not consistent with the IACtHR's position in Artavia toward
the claims of the applicants and the Commission because they had no more
limitation than to refer to the account of the facts given in the
Commission's report.o 6
Cass Sunstein considers that courts adopting a maximalist approach, in
relation to the setting of rules and the giving of theoretical justifications, are
more likely to make mistakes and are less compatible with liberty amid
pluralism, something central to democracy.10 7 In addition, the IACtHR's
maximalist approach increases its chances of behaving inconsistently. This
happens because it is impossible for a court to analyze every single detail
related to a case; so the IACtHR will end up analyzing scrupulously some
facts and arguments in certain matters, but not in others. This behavior
contrasts with the more moderate position of the ECtHR, which tends to
address only those issues that are necessary for deciding a case, establishing
only narrow principles. 0 8 Such an attitude gives the ECtHR the appearance
of being more predictable and impartial.
V. THE USE OF SOFT LAW, CASE DECISIONS, AND
OTHER NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS
The IACtHR tends to make reference to non-binding treaties, soft law,
and domestic and international judgments,' 09 often to justify its own
decisions. However, it does not clarify the value it gives them. The use of
non-binding instruments may be necessary in some specific situations.
Nevertheless, it has disadvantages that suggest leaving such use only for
parties. Besides, those opposed to IVF at the domestic level made similar claims to those of the State.
Id. at 71.).
105. This is described below, under the heading "IX. Uniformity of Appreciation."
106. Cf Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1132.
107. SUNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 24-41.
108. For an example of the ECtHR's practice of analyzing only the main alleged violations of a
case, see Fernindez Martinez v. Spain (App. No. 56030/07) Eur. Ct. H.R. 108 (June 12, 2014).
109. This can be seen in most cases of the IACtHR, so it is not necessary to give specific
examples. Regarding the use of comparative law by courts in general, see Paolo G. Carozza, Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of
the European Court ofHuman Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1217-37 (1998).
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exceptional circumstances. One of the problems with this technique is that
it may place binding instruments at the same level as non-binding ones, as
if this difference, which is essential in international law, was irrelevant.
Indeed, at times it appears that the IACtHR requires member States to abide
by norms taken from some non-binding instrument and not from the
ACHR.110 This is complex because members of the OAS "did not simply
delegate to the Court the task of adopting whatever standards it chooses
from a future corpus of soft law texts.""' Treating soft law as if it were
applicable law may also have the collateral effect of generating, in States, a
higher reluctance to agree on non-binding instruments and non-directly-
enforceable international treaties.
On the other hand, the unlimited use of international instruments also
favors their consideration out of context, because the reader of the
IACtHR's judgments may not be aware of the circumstances surrounding
each one of the agreements and decisions that are quoted. This is especially
complex when the IACtHR quotes only half or part of a sentence. Finally,
the use of case law from other jurisdictions inevitably leads to dismissing
the differences in wording that exist between the legal provisions that
courts are supposed to apply. For instance, in Artavia, the IACtHR gave a
disproportionate importance to European judgments when defining the legal
status of the embryo.' 12 It did so in a way that dismissed the fundamental
difference that exists between the wording of the ACHR and of the
European Convention on Human Rights." 3 Such a difference was clearly
perceived by the ECtHR, as it can be read in a paragraph that was,
ironically, quoted by the IACtHR:
Unlike Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
which provides that the right to life must be protected "in
general, from the moment of conception", Article 2 of the
Convention is silent as to the temporal limitations of the right to
life and, in particular, does not define "everyone" ("toute
personne") whose "life" is protected by the Convention.l14
The use of non-binding instruments is also complex because the
IACtHR ends up utilizing local or diferent regions' instruments for
interpreting a treaty framed within a particular region. The ACHR's
110. See Fleury, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 236, at J 85-87.
111. Neuman, supra note 50, at 115.
112. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at $$ 247-53.
113. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
114. Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, quoted in Artavia-Murillo $ 237.
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framers were intent on giving this treaty a distinctive hallmark according to
the peculiarities of the Americas. This is why one author remarked that the
IACtHR's extensive use of the ECtHR's case law could prompt States to
complain that they had agreed to abide by the ACHR and not by several
decades of ECtHR's case law.' 15  He even affirmed that States had
apparently done so at the OAS.116 The IACtHR may also quote some U.N.
treaties that do not enjoy a wide acceptance, or which do enjoy it only
because they did not establish a jurisdictional system for enforcing
compliance with them (a role that the IACtHR seems to try to fulfill).
Ruiz-Chiriboga, a former senior attorney of the IACtHR, considers
that importing concepts and definitions from other human rights systems
dismisses the fact that the IACtHR owes its existence to the Inter-American
system. 117 It also overlooks that judgments of other regions are the result of
an analysis of the existing consensus among the States of these other
regional systems. Hence, importing these decisions without any further
analysis entails the imposition in the Americas of the consensuses that were
reached on a different continent. This holds especially true in relation to
the ECtHR's case law, which according to Ruiz-Chiriboga is quoted with
particular ardor by the IACtHR."' Finally, using foreign instruments may
result in ignoring consensuses that States in the Americas have actually
reached.1 19 Somebody may argue that using foreign consensuses may not
be formally adequate, but that it ends up being more protective of human
rights. This is, however, not necessarily so. In fact, disregarding the
ACHR may result in granting less human rights.120
One of the most relevant criticisms to this technique is the IACtHR's
lack of clear criteria for selecting the documents and judgments that it
quotes. In Artavia, for instance, the reader may wonder why the IACtHR
115. Nicolas Boeglin Naumovic, ANALYSE DES SYSTEMES EUROPEEN ET INTERAMERICAIN DE
PROTECTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME: ETUDE DE L'IMPACT DE L'EXPERIENCE EUROPEENNE SUR LE
SYSTEME INTERAMERICAIN, 45 (1993).
116. Id
117. Oswaldo Ruiz Chiriboga, Cldusulas Autdnomas, Subordinadas e Incorporadas de
Igualdad y No Discriminacidn en el Sistema Interamericano [Independent Subordinated and
Incorporated Clauses of Equality and Nondiscriminatoin in the Inter-American System], in LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LAS SENTENCIAS DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA SOBRE HONDURAs 175,
178-79 (Joaquin A. Mejia R. ed., 2012).
118. Id. at 179.
119. Id. at 178-80.
120. See, e.g., Boeglin Naumovic, supra note 115, at 25-26 (wondering whether the IACtHR's
advisory opinion No. 4 was too restrictive because of being based on a decision of the ECtHR, in spite
of the fact that the European Convention's text would be more restrictive than the ACHR in the matter
of non-discrimination).
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chose to quote court decisions of the United States and Colombia,121 instead
of those of Peru and Chile, which had contrary outcomes; why did it quote
Irish law for referring to the embryos' status before implantation,12 2 but not
after that moment, when the lives of unborn children and their mothers have
equal constitutional protection;123 why did the IACtHR not stress, when
quoting the ECtHR, that this court grants States a high margin of
appreciation for deciding on the protection of pre-natal life. In other words,
the use of instruments of other jurisdictions, unless they cover the totality of
a particular region or describe a legal system in detail, allow questioning
the impartiality of the court that chooses the documents it quotes at its
discretion. If the IACtHR uses this technique, it should not be surprised if
some readers wonder whether it is judging in accordance with law or with
the personal preferences of its judges. In fact, Ruiz-Chiriboga has already
been critical in this regard of a case of discrimination. He affirmed that the
IACtHR referred to domestic legislation of States, regardless of whether
they were under the IACtHR's jurisdiction, only when it served its
purposes, avoiding all references to domestic decisions that went against its
own arguments.124
VI. INTERPRETATION
The IACtHR's practices when interpreting the ACHR are very much
related with the foregoing theme. This issue is in itself one of high
complexity, which would require an in-depth study. Hence, this
commentary can only outline some of the main aspects of the interpretive
mechanisms used by the IACtHR. It is important to note that the following
paragraphs are not suggesting that the IACtHR use an originalist system of
interpretation. This section is only aimed at highlighting some difficulties
that result from not following more objective criteria when interpreting a
legal document.
A. Interpretation According to the Rules of the Vienna Convention
On several occasions the IACtHR has stated that the VCLT's
interpretation rules are the principles guiding its interpretation of the
121. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at $ 185 n.283.
122. Id.
123. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40(3)(3) ("The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far
as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.").
124. Ruiz Chiriboga, supra note 117, at 188; see also Neuman, supra note 50, at 114 ("[T]he
importation of soft law standards more likely results from pragmatic, institutional considerations.").
[Vol. 21:1
ACHR.125 The VCLT not only sets out the criteria whereby a norm must be
interpreted, but it also enshrines a system of precedence between these
different criteria. It states that treaties should "be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."1 26 Hence,
the first thing that must be taken into account when interpreting a treaty is
its wording, which must be interpreted according to the usual meaning
given to the relevant words according to the object and purpose of the
treaty.127 If the wording is clear, the interpreter should not purse the next
interpretive criteria.
This seems to be very clear, but it is worth giving an example. When
the ACHR forbids all forms of "exploitation of man by man,"128 the word
"man" must be read according to its ordinary meaning. However, the word
"man" has several ordinary meanings, such as "human being," and "adult
male," among others.12 9 Hence, the ordinary meaning of the word is not
enough for interpreting it, and the reader must take into account the context
of this Article (which is not the same as when the ACHR refers to the "right
of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family").130
Finally, the reader must analyze the object and purpose of the treaty, which
is the judicial protection of a certain number of human rights, and
determine whether this interpretation is compatible with this object and
purpose. As a result, it will be concluded that the word "man" refers to
"human being." There are moments when the "context" may be found not
only in the convention itself, but also in some other treaties or related
agreements. Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) gives an exhaustive list of these instruments."' Besides the
foregoing, the VCLT refers to some supplementary means of interpretation,
125. See e.g., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3, 48 (Sept. 8, 1983); see
also e.g., Article 55 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-20/09, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 20, 123 (Sept. 29, 2009). The relevant norms of the VCLT are articles 31-33.
See VCLT, supra note 55, at arts. 31-33.
126. VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 31(1).
127. Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty
Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 LAw & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS
443, 444 (2010).
128. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 21(3).
129. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/man (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
130. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 17(2).
131. See Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Vio-Grossi, J., dissenting).
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such as the preparatory works of a treaty. 132  These can be used if the
previous rules are not enough in themselves to interpret a treaty.
On more than one occasion the IACtHR has failed to apply these
interpretive methods correctly.133 In fact, in some cases the IACtHR has
paid little attention to the text of the ACHR, which brings about the danger
of transforming the wording of the treaty into something "banal and of little
relevance."l 34  This has happened, for instance, in relation to the right to
equality,13 5 and with the expulsion of aliens whose presence in a State is
blatantly unlawful.136 This may create the impression that the scope of the
ACHR's provisions depends on the will of the IACtHR's judges.' 37
In Artavia this problem was manifest when, after recognizing that
there are different opinions as to when life begins, the IACtHR ruled that it
could not give preference to one kind of scientific literature over another.' 3 8
The IACtHR failed to note that it is the ACHR itself which adopts a
"preference." The text of the treaty is clear when stating that there is a right
to life from the moment of conception (even though it may not always be
protected by law). The IACtHR makes another mistake when interpreting
the word conception as meaning implantation. Such understanding is
neither the ordinary nor the legal meaning of the term conception. The
redefinition of this word was based exclusively on the declaration of expert
witness Zegers, in total disregard of a great number of legal instruments in
the Americas referring to conception.13 9  This term had also been
132. VCLT, supra note 55, at art. 32.
133. This problem does not only affect the IACtHR. For instance, former Commissioner
Shelton stated that the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights' interpretation of Art. 4(1) in the
Baby Boy case had "major problems ari[sing] largely as a result of .... ignoring the existence of the
canons of interpretation codified by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties." Dinah Shelton,
Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American System: The Case of "Baby Boy", 2 HUM. RTS. L.J.
309, 313 (1981).
134. Ariel E. Dulitzky, El Principio de Igualdad y No Discriminacidn [The Equality and
Nondiscrimination Principle]. Claroscuros de la Jurisprudencia Interamericana, 3 ANUARIO DD.HH.
15, 17 (2007).
135. Id. at 17-18.
136. ACHR supra, note 4 at art. 22(6) ("An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to this
Convention may be expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with law."); see
also Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, 158 (Oct. 24, 2012) (the IACtHR is making absolute abstraction of the
requirement of "lawfulness" when interpreting the ACHR).
137. Dulitzky, supra note 134, at 19.
138. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1 185.
139. See Controversial Conceptions, supra note 5, at 219 (showing that many constitutions of
the region are establishing an explicit protection of the unborn from the moment of conception).
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interpreted, by domestic courts, as being a synonym for fertilization.14 0
Even in the Inter-American Commission's Baby Boy case the two
dissenting opinions equate conception to fertilization (this notion was taken
as a given, and was not contested by the majority).' 4 ' A dismissal of the
text of the ACHR is also noticeable when the IACtHR rules that the
expression "in general" means "gradual and incremental according to its
development."l 42  The same can be said regarding the IACtHR's ruling that
the provision protecting life from the moment of conception is essentially
aimed at protecting women.143  In these cases, the IACtHR has added
qualifications that do not exist in the ACHR. As a result, the "general"
protection of the unborn becomes "exceptional." Judge Vio-Grossi's
dissenting opinion deals with this issue in detail.
When interpreting according to the rules of the VCLT, the IACtHR
also fails to understand fully what constitutes the "context" of the ACHR.
While the VCLT, codifying international custom, specifically defines what
constitutes a treaty's context,'" the IACtHR tends to extend it to all of the
corpus juris of international law. This criterion, instead of being a guide
for interpreting law, may become a mechanism for creating law, as was
140. See Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], Apr. 18, 2008, Rol: 740-07-
CDS, "considerando" Nos. 50, 67 (Chile); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court of
Justice], Feb. 1, 2012, Dictamen, at 10 (Honduras), available at http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/
wlw/admin/fileFS.php?table=decisiones documentos&field-esarchivo&id=357 (last visited Oct. 17,
2014); see also Tribunal Consitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court] (Oct. 16, 2009), Exp. No. 02005-
2009-PA/TC, 1 53 (Peru), available at http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencial 2009/02005-2009-AA.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2014); and also the Costa Rican Supreme Court's decision that motivated the
Artavia Murillo case.
141. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Res. 23/81, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.54, doc.
9 (1980-1981).
142. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1 264.
143. Id.at1222.
144. VCLT, supra note 66, at art. 31(2), (3):
(2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
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stated when referring to the use of soft law and other non-binding
instruments when interpreting the ACHR.
B. Evolutive Interpretation Without Objective Parameters
Evolutive interpretation is in itself a developing concept "whose
contours are as yet quite unclear."1 45  However, there seems to be a
consensus in international practice that a treaty may evolve if it utilizes
"evolutive terms," this means open-ended concepts, for defining the content
of a particular right.14 6  This method of interpretation may be used for
extending the content of a right in a way that was not foreseen by the
framers of a treaty, or for departing from precedents. However, evolutive
interpretations cannot derive from international treaties "a right that was not
included therein at the outset," especially when its "omission was
deliberate."l 47  Indeed, "[t]he only matter which can be evolutively
interpreted-and perhaps thereby expanded into unforeseen fields of
application-is a matter which is already explicit or implicit in the wording
of the text." 48 A fortiori, an evolutive interpretation should not contravene
the express wording of a treaty. This is why, for instance, the European
system ended the death penalty through the ratification of additional
protocols to the European Convention, even though such punishment was
practically extinct in Europe.14 9
In spite of the foregoing, the IACtHR seems to consider itself
absolutely free to determine when and how the ACHR evolves. The
145. Arato, supra note 127, at 444 n.5 (referring to an argument of Malgosia Fitzmaurice).
146. Id. at 468, 476 (Arato refers to a more contested rationale for evolution, one based on the
object and purpose of a treaty. He considers that an evolution based on this rationale could only be used
when it is necessary for giving effect to the object and purpose of a treaty, and that "mere convenience"
would be an insufficient justification for using this rationale, since it could lead to a "superfluous
application of evolutive interpretation", and could "seriously undermine certainty in the law of treaties,
since anything could be judged to be evolutive." However, even evolution based on the object and
purpose of a treaty cannot go against the explicit wording of a treaty.).
147. Johnston & Others v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 53 (1986).
148. Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of
Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HuM. RTs. L.J. 57, 66 (1990) (asserted by Paul
Mahoney, a current judge of the ECtHR).
149. The ECtHR has stated hypothetically that some exceptions to human rights established in
the European Convention may be considered abrogated if there is a generalized abolition of them,
"remo[ving] a textual limit on the scope for evolutive interpretation of Article 3." Soering v. The
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 1 103 (1989); see also Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R., 1 163-65 (by contrast, in Artavia-Murillo, the IACtHR enlarged an exception to a particular
right). Even a narrow hypothesis like that of the ECtHR could be argued against, because the abolition
of a particular practice does not necessarily imply the will of States to limit their possibilities of
revisiting previous policies.
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IACtHR even incorporates rights that were explicitly excluded from this
treaty, ruling against the ACHR's wording, as happened in Artavia."s in
contrast with the IACtHR's practice, the ECtHR utilizes some mechanisms
for determining when it is possible for a treaty to evolve, and it will not
establish rights that the framers of the European Convention excluded on
purpose.s15  The ECtHR will allow the evolution of rights to situations
unforeseen by the framers of the Convention, but only when this treaty uses
open-ended terms. It will also follow some more or less objective criteria
allowing it to reach these kinds of conclusions. For instance, the ECtHR
often uses the concept of consensus among member States of the Council of
Europe. Judge Pdrez-Pdrez once complained that the lACtHR dismisses the
need of reaching a consensus among the States Party, before considering
that the ACHR has evolved. 15 2  Consensus will not always be enough
before the ECtHR. For instance, in A, B & C v. Ireland, the ECtHR
determined that a broad consensus among European States about permitting
abortions when the mother's health is at stake was not enough for the Irish
broad protection of the unborn to be disproportionate. 5 3
C Most Favorable Interpretation and the Object and Purpose of a Treaty
Artavia also claims to interpret the ACHR in accordance with the
"principle of the most favorable interpretation" and according to the "object
and purpose of the treaty."' 5 4 The IACtHR dealt with these two criteria at
the same time, despite their differences. These two criteria are more
complex than what they may appear at a first glance.
150. Malarino defines as activist the interpretive method of the IACtHR. Ezequiel Malarino,
Judicial Activism, Punitivism and Supranationalisation: Illiberal and Antidemocratic Tendencies of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 665, 668-81 (2012) [hereinafter
Judicial Activism]; see also id at 670-72 (regarding evolutive or progressive interpretation).
151. Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 153 (1986).
152. Atala-Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, 20-21 (partially dissenting opinion of Judge P6rez-P6rez) (Feb. 24, 2012).
153. A, B, & C v. Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 1237; see generally Gr6gor Puppinck, Abortion and
the European Convention on Human Rights, 3 IR. J. LEGAL STUD. 142 (2013) (showing that the ECtHR
has defined no right to abortion).
154. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at $T 257-63.
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1. Most Favorable Interpretation
The criterion of the most favorable interpretation (pro homine or pro
persona)'5 has some drawbacks in relation to the rights or interests
underlying the State's position. This assertion requires explaining a
preliminary issue. Contentious proceedings before the IACtHR appear as
cases where there is a simple contest between the Commission and
applicant, on one side, and the State on the other. The reality is, however,
more complex. Appearances often conceal a clash of rights where the State
is defending the position or rights of other people. In fact, in some cases
the position represented by the State has been previously argued and
adjudicated in domestic courts as a matter of human rights. It may even
happen that, because of political agendas, the Government may not wish to
further "the State's position." This leads to a situation where the State's
formal position is not its material position.
A case where the rights or interests underlying the State's position
were clear-regardless of whether the merits of this case are agreed with-
was that of The Last Temptation of Christ.' At the international level, this
was simply a case of freedom of expression. At the domestic level,
however, "the State's position" had its origin in a case about the right to
honor of certain people. 58 In fact, the domestic prohibition of this film was
a result of a "recurso de proteccidn," a remedy devised specifically for the
protection of human rights.'59 The rights and interests underlying the
State's position were made even clearer when those who had sought to
protect their right to honor at the domestic level asked the IACtHR to allow
them to intervene as third parties. The IACtHR, however, denied this
request.160  This case shows that the "most favorable interpretation" is
155. See Alvaro Francisco Amaya-Villarreal, El Principio Pro Homine: Interpretacidn
Extensiva v. el Consentimiento del Estado [The Principle of Pro Homine: Extensive Interpretation v.
The State's Consent], 5 REV. COLOM. DER. INT. 337 (2005) (for a description of this concept).
156. Verdugo and Garcia refer to the problem that arises between acknowledgements of State
responsibility and the rights and interests underlying the State's position. Sergio Verdugo R. & Jos6
Francisco Garcia G., Radiografia al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos [The X-Ray of the
Inter-American System ofHuman Rights], 25 REV. ACTUALIDAD JUR. 175, 183-84 (2012).
157. Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ), Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001).
158. This remedy was lodged before domestic courts by a group of people on behalf of
themselves, Jesus Christ, and the Catholic Church. They asked domestic courts to prohibit the
exhibition of the film alleging that it would violate, mainly, their right to honor. Id at I 60(e) (in
relation to 45(c) and 45(d)).
159. Id. at 71.
160. Olmedo-Bustos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, at 21; see also Atala-Riffo and
Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239,11 8-
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actually a relative concept. If the IACtHR decides to give freedom of
expression the broadest interpretation, it will necessarily give a restrictive
interpretation to the right to honor.
Something similar happens in cases of human rights violations that are
of a criminal nature at the domestic level, where the interests that underlie
the State's position are clearly noticeable. The IACtHR's approach to these
cases has been categorized as one of "punitivism." 6 ' This means that when
the IACtHR rules on the State's duty to punish human rights offenders
(applying thus a more favorable interpretation for the victims), it ends up
restricting the offenders' fair trial guarantees. 16 2  It is interesting to note
that, while the ACHR says nothing in relation to a State obligation to
punish human rights offenders, it explicitly provides that fair trial
guarantees are human rights.16 3  The existence of rights and interests
underlying the State's formal position should deter the IACtHR from using
lightly the method of interpreting according to what is "the most favorable."
This is especially so in a case like Artavia, where "the most favorable" for
those who wanted to make use of embryos or commit an abortion is clearly
"the least favorable" position for those who have a right to life according to
the relevant section of Article 4(1).'6 Because of the foregoing, even
though the pro homine principle is important, it cannot be transformed into
a wild-card with which to extend State's international obligations in one
way or another.165
9 (Feb. 24, 2012) (something similar occurred, because the IACtHR denied the girls' father (who had
their legal custody) the chance to appear before the court).
161. Judicial Activism, supra note 150, at 681-84.
162. See id. at 684 (Malarino affirms that punitivism goes directly against the pro homine
principle).
163. Judicial guarantees of alleged human rights violators provide a clear example of rights
underlying the State's position, especially in cases that are criminal in nature at the domestic level.
There are many judgments where the IACtHR gives the names of alleged violators of human rights,
without giving them the chance to appear before it. This is complex from the point of view of the
presumption of innocence. This explains why the State of Colombia told the IACtHR that it would not
be able to fulfill the remedy of publishing the judgment, unless it was authorized to erase the names of
the people who were mentioned in the IACtHR's decision, because they had not yet been sentenced at
the domestic level. The IACtHR agreed to this petition. Escu&Zapata v. Colombia, Monitoring
Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 1 3-4 (May 18, 2010). In contrast
with the IACtHR's custom, the ECtHR tends to give only the initials of third parties who have not
appeared in trial.
164. Cf, Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 259.
165. Amaya-Villarreal, supra note 155, at 337.
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2. Interpretation According to the Object and Purpose of the Treaty
The IACtHR affirms that the object of the ACHR involves the
"protection of the basic rights of individual human beings." 6 This
definition is partly correct, as it would be to say that the object and purpose
of the ACHR is "to bring justice." The broadness of this definition,
however, may give rise to interpretive mistakes. Hence, it would be more
appropriate to state that the object and purpose of the ACHR is the creation
of regional binding standards for the protection of certain human rights, and
the establishment of a system for supervising their fulfillment. This
distinction is important, because the ACHR's framers did not want to
protect all human rights, but only those, which are referred to in this treaty.
This limited character of the rights recognized in international treaties
cannot be considered simply a negative consequence of States' sovereignty.
It has been said that it is also due to the fact that in a pluralist system, there
are different conceptions of rights, and that States should enjoy a margin for
recognizing or not some other non-enumerated rights. 167
Notwithstanding the fact that the object and purpose of a treaty can be
used only for interpreting the text of a treaty, the IACtHR tends to use it for
extending the ACHR's scope. This shows why it is so important to have an
accurate description of the object and purpose of the ACHR. Defining it
simply as the "protection of the basic rights of individual human beings"
may serve to broaden the scope of the ACHR to cover an unlimited number
of rights. This issue is particularly relevant in light of the existence of
different conceptions of human rights, some of which are openly opposed to
the rights established in the ACHR. In order to give just one example, there
are authors who give many rights-based explanations for concluding that
new-born infants have no inherent right to life. 16 8 Such an understanding is
166. Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, 15 (Nov. 20, 2007).
167. Manuel N6fiez Poblete, Sobre la Doctrina del Margen de Apreciacidn Nacional. La
Experiencia Latinoamericana Confrontada y el Thelos Constitucional de una Ticnica de Adjudicaci6n
del Derecho Internacional de Los Derechos Humanos [In Regards to the States' Margin of
Appreciation. The Latin American Experience and the Constutional Thelos of an Ajudication Technique
of International Human Rights Law], EL MARGEN DE APRECIACI6N EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO
DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: PROYECCIONES REGIONALES Y NACIONALES 3, 28 (Manuel N6itez Poblete &
Paola Andrea Acosta Alvarado, 2012).
168. HELGA KUHSE & PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE? THE PROBLEM OF
HANDICAPPED INFANTS 189-97 (1985) (restricting infanticide to undesired disabled babies until the
28th day after birth); see also Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, After-Birth Abortion: Why Should
the Baby Live?, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 261, 263 (2013) (considering that parents should be allowed to
request the killing of their newborn babies, regardless of their health, as long as there are circumstances
that would allow mothers to undergo an abortion, including socioeconomic reasons).
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clearly contrary to the values enshrined in the ACHR, so it could not be
applied within the Inter-American system. In this regard, it is easier to
avoid holding misconceptions when reading the ACHR if the interpreter
considers that this treaty's object and purpose is the protection of the rights
that it explicitly enshrines.
While interpreting Article 4(1) according to the ACHR's object and
purpose in Artavia, the IACtHR gives examples of domestic courts
attempting "to find an adequate balance between possible competing
rights," which would "constitute a relevant reference to interpret the scope
of the expression 'in general, from the moment of conception' contained in
Article 4(l)."169 These examples are perplexing. For instance, the IACtHR
refers to the case of the United States, even though this country's regulation
of abortion is openly incompatible with the ACHR's protection of the
unborn.o70  When doing so, the IACtHR seems to ignore that in Roe v.
Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if the Fourteenth Amendment
would have suggested that the unborn had personhood, Roe's case would
have collapsed, "for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
specifically by the Amendment." 71
VII. EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE ACCORDING TO
SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION
In contrast to the ECtHR, the IACtHR engages in much evaluation of
evidence. This is due to several reasons, such as the unreliability of some
domestic judiciaries. The IACtHR weighs evidence according to sound
judicial discretion (sana critica).17 2 This is a Hispanic notion that requires
169. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 260 (the Spanish authentic
version uses the word procurar, which can mean both to attempt and to achieve, so it is not absolutely
clear whether the IACtHR considered that they had succeeded or not in their attempt).
170. It was almost a unanimous understanding that the United States would have had to make a
reservation on this matter if it wanted to ratify the ACHR while keeping its regulation of abortion. See
e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES. WITH OR WITHOUT
RESERVATIONS? 47 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981); see also PASQUALUCCI, supra note 6, at 341; see
also "Prepared Statement of Professor Thomas J. Farer," in International Human Rights Treaties,
Hearings Before the Commission on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 9th Cong., 2d sess. 97, at 99 (1979)
(quoted in Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 156, 176-77 (1990)). However, there were a few isolated interpretations
that considered the U.S. legislation on abortion compatible with the ACHR. E.g., CECILIA MEDINA
QUIROGA, LA CONVENCION AMERICANA: VIDA, INTEGRIDAD PERSONAL, LIBERTAD PERSONAL,
DEBIDO PROCESO Y RECURSO JUDICIAL 76 (2003).
171. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
172. See generally Alvaro Pa61, Sana Critica: The System for Evaluating Evidence Utilized by
the Inter-American Court, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193 (2013).
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analyzing evidence according to the "rules of logic and experience."1 7 3
This traditional formulation of sana critica just means that evidence should
be weighed according to the "commonsense rules of reason and to the
average experience of the world."1 7 4  The system of sound judicial
discretion resembles the way in which common law judges weigh evidence.
It allows judges to evaluate evidence without being constrained by specific
rules of weight,17 ' but requires them to explain their reasoning, so that the
reader can assess whether they weighed the evidence properly. This is why
the IACtHR goes into substantial detail. when enumerating the evidence
used in reaching each one of its particular conclusions. Such detailed
accounts are positive and praiseworthy.
The IACtHR tends to weigh evidence appropriately. There are,
however, areas in which it must be more attentive. For instance, the "rules
of logic and experience" would require a court to take into account the
interests that witnesses and expert witnesses may have in the result of a
case when assessing their declarations. In Artavia, the IACtHR failed to do
this when it based most of its biological statements on the evidence of a
single expert witness, Fernando Zegers-Hochschild, dismissing all opposing
evidence.176  Of course in some cases, there could be reasons for giving a
higher weight to the declarations of a particular witness, such as his or her
expertise. Zegers, indeed, has vast experience. However, the IACtHR
failed to take into account that this expert's interests in the results of the
case went beyond those found in a neutral witness. Not only was IVF his
main professional activity, but he was previously a directive member of
organizations devoted to promoting this technique. 77 This does not mean
that Zegers' statements should have been dismissed, but rather they should
173. Joel Gonzdlez Castillo, La Fundamentacidn de las Sentencias y La Sana Critica [The
Reasoning Behind Judgments and Sound Judicial Discretion], 33 REV. CHIL. DER. 93, 95-98 (2006)
(supporting the need to follow the rules of logic and experience are the basic requirements of sound
judicial discretion); see also Hdctor Fix-Zamudio, Orden y Valoracidn de las Pruebas en la Funci6n
Contenciosa de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Order and Evaluation of the Evidence
in Contentious Proceedings Before the Inter-American Court for Human Rights], I MEMORIA DEL
SEMINARIO: EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCI)N DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL
UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI 197, 214 (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2003) (in the context
of the Inter-American system).
174. Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards ofProof 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659, 668 (2003).
175. As it would happen according to the system of legal proof Id. at 668-73.
176. See e.g., Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at $ 180 (in relation to
186).
177. INSTITUTO CHILENO DE MEDICINA REPRODUCTIVA, http://www.icmer.org/
acercade directorio.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); see also Fernando Zegers-Hochschild et al., Human
Rights to In Vitro Fertilization, 123 INT'L J. OF GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS 86 (2013) (an article
published by Zegers-Hochschild soon after Artavia-Murillo was issued).
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have been weighed in light of the other evidence, and that the IACtHR
should have taken into account the fact that his interests in the results of the
case went beyond mere scientific concern.
Similarly, it is not appropriate for the IACtHR to give a dogmatic
value to the statement of an expert or international body, unless it gives
explicit reasons as to why it grants them such great weight. The IACtHR
could, for instance, describe the decision-making process of the body or the
way in which it reached the particular conclusion on which it relies. This
would not be something new to the IACtHR because it did so in Miguel
Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru.'7 8 The aforementioned is even more relevant
when the IACtHR quotes reports or previous findings of the Inter-American
Commission (a party in the case). In Artavia, the IACtHR quoted some of
the Commission's findings in the Baby Boy case as if they were undoubted
facts.179  If the IACtHR wishes to uphold some of the Commission's
findings or reports, it should analyze them in detail. The IACtHR should
have followed its approach in Vera- Vera et al. v. Ecuador, where it
assessed a report of the Commission that was based on an in loco visit to
Ecuador. 80
VIII. HISPANOCENTRISM
Some years ago, it was stated that the OAS was "still largely a Latin
American organization shaped by the problems and idiosyncrasies of that
particular group of States."' 8 ' This assertion can also be made of the Inter-
American system of human rights and, in particular, of the IACtHR.182
178. Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, at 197(3H5)
(describing some features of the Peruvian Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, such as the way in
which it was created, its aims, and how its members had been appointed).
179. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at J 197, 199 (copying these
findings was not even necessary, because they were an interpretation-highly contestable--of legal
instruments, which the IACtHR could have done by itself).
180. In this case the IACtHR noted that the Commission did not provide enough data, surveys
or evidence on a specific matter, and concluded that the Commission's report was not enough to prove
the facts asserted. Vera Vera et al v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C), 80-81 (May 19, 2011).
181. Ver6nica G6mez, The Interaction Between the Political Actors of the OAS the
Commission and the Court, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 173, 175 (David J.
Harris & Stephen Livingstone ed., Oxford University Press, 1998).
182. For some of the Caribbean States' complaints, see Auro Fraser, From Forgotten Through
Friction to the Future: The Evolving Relationship of the Anglophone Caribbean and the Inter-American
System of Human Rights, 15 CARIB. L.R. 101 (2005); see also Oliver Jackman, The Caribbean and the
Inter-American Human Rights System, available at http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/5/2454/7.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
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Such hispanocentrism is inadequate for an institution pertaining to the
OAS, an international organization with four official languages that unite
countries of diverse traditions. Several aspects of the of the IACtHR's
behavior reveal its hispanocentrism. For instance, its use of Hispanic legal
concepts (such as sana critica), its disregard of Anglo-Saxon legal concepts
(such as the standard of review), and its dismissal of diverse understandings
of law (such as the dualist conception of international law in some countries
in the Americas).18 3
An example of hispanocentrism in Artavia is given by the IACtHR's
interpretation of the word "conception." Both the majority and Vio-
Grossi's dissenting opinions (with opposite results) were based on a
definition of this word according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Royal
Academy (Diccionario de la Real Academia Espailola). When doing so,
they forgot that the ACHR has three other authentic versions: English,
French and Portuguese. Had these versions been taken into account, the
interpretation of this concept would have been made easier, because
authoritative French and English dictionaries give a clearer meaning to the
word conception (equivalent to fertilization, not to implantation).18 4 This
manifestation of hispanocentrism was largely absent from the early
advisory opinions issued by the Court, which took into account the diverse
translations of the ACHR.185
The IACtHR's hispanocentrism is also patent when reading the
English version of its judgments, because there is much room for improving
them. 186 Of course, there are inherent difficulties in translating, especially
when doing so into a language of a different linguistic family, or of a
diverse legal tradition. In addition, the translator must be careful not to
imply a value judgment in a given situation when translating a concept in
one way or another.187
183. This conception is dismissed by the doctrine of conventionality control.
184. OXFORD DICTIONARIES, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/conception (last visited Nov. 22, 2014); see also DICTIONNAIRE DE L'ACADtMIE FRANCAISE,
available at http://www.academie-francaise.fr/le-dictionnaire/la-9e-edition (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
185. See generally, e.g., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the
Practice of Journalism (arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 5, 1 29 (Nov. 13, 1985); see also Enforceability of the Right to
Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1) and 2 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-7/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 7, 120 (Aug. 29, 1986).
186. See Translation, supra note 52 (for a general analysis of the IACtHR's translations).
187. See Alvaro Pafil Diaz, La Corte Interamericana in Vitro: Comentarios sobre su Proceso
de Toma de Decisiones a Propdsito del Caso Artavia [The Inter-American Court in Vitro:
Commentaries on its Decision-Making Process in Light of the Artavia Case], 2 DER. PUIB.
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IX. UNIFORMITY OF APPRECIATION
A. The Margin ofAppreciation
The ECtHR tends to grant some deference to States' interpretations of
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. This
deference is called the margin of appreciation.' 88 It allows the existence of
diverse interpretations on matters of fundamental rights and freedoms. By
allowing "a certain latitude to differ in their application of the same abstract
rights," 89 the ECtHR "has to a limited extent recognised the fact that while
human rights are universal at the level of abstraction, they are national at
the level of application."'90 The extent of the margin of appreciation is not
clear cut because its breadth "varies and depends on a number of factors
including the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the
individual, the nature of the interference, and the object pursued by the
interference."'91 When determining whether there is a need to apply the
margin of appreciation, the ECtHR often analyzes the existence of regional
consensus on the matter.
The IACtHR has referred to the margin of appreciation on only a few
occasions.192  It tends to keep for itself the detailed appreciation or
IBEROAMERICANO 303, 331 (2013) (describing what could be called a value judgment in a translation of
Artavia).
188. Protocol 15 to the European Convention seeks to include this concept in the preamble to
the Convention. The new relevant section would provide:
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms
defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they
enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.
Art. 1, Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, June 6, 2013, C.E.T.S. No. 213.
189. Lord Leonard Hoffmann, The Universality ofHuman Rights, 125 LAW Q. REV. 416, 423
(2009).
190. Id.
191. Fernandez Martinez v. Spain (App. No. 56030/07) Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 125 (2014).
192. See e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, 58 (Jan. 19, 1984); see also
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 107, 161 (July 2, 2004); see also
Barreto-Leiva v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
206, 90 (Nov. 17, 2009) (the English version of Barreto-Leiva v. Venezuela used the expression
"margin of discretion," but the Spanish version uses the expression "margen de apreciacidn."). Some
individual judges have also referred to the margin of appreciation. See e.g., P6rez in Atala-Riffo and
Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, 23
(Prez-Prez, J., partially dissenting) (Feb. 24, 2012).
ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
determination of the content of rights, having no major deference toward
States' interpretation of them.' 93 This is even the case when the right has an
open-ended formulation. Furthermore, the IACtHR pays little attention to
whether the facts of a case confront national values, such as in Artavia. In
this case, the State explicitly requested the IACtHR to refer to the margin of
appreciation. The IACtHR, however, replied that it was not necessary to
refer to the margin of appreciation in light of conclusions at which it had
arrived previously in the judgment.194 Such a ruling is perplexing, because
the State's claim was that the margin of appreciation should take effect
precisely before the IACtHR reached these conclusions.
A court's use of the margin of appreciation clearly affects the outcome
of a case. For instance, the ECtHR-in spite of the European Convention's
lack of an explicit protection of the unborn-has established that the
regulation of abortion falls within the margin of appreciation of each
State. 195 By contrast, the IACtHR seems to be implicitly ruling that States
cannot establish certain kinds of bans on abortion, in spite of the ACHR's
explicit protection of life from the moment of conception.196
B. Argument Against the Margin ofAppreciation
In the Inter-American context, the argument that is usually given
against the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is that law, democracy
and human rights in Latin-American nations are not as deep-rooted as in
European nations.19 7  Thusly, it would be inadequate to grant these feeble
193. See Verdugo & Garcia, supra note 156, at 195-96 (they consider this as one of the
democratic deficits of the Inter-American system).
194. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at T 316.
195. A, B & C v. Ireland (App. No. 25579/05) Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 16, 2010); see also
Puppinck, supra note 153; see also U.N.'DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, ABORTION POLICIES: A
GLOBAL REVIEW, VOLUMES 1-3 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications
/abortion/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) (in Europe, Malta forbids every kind of voluntary abortion, San
Marino has no explicit legal exception to its criminalization, Ireland allows abortions in cases where the
mother's life is at stake, and Poland has also a rather protective legislation on the matter); see also THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, 2011, art. 2, available at http://www.mkab.hu/rules/fundamental-
law (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) (Hungary recently enacted a new constitution protecting the unborn
"from the moment of conception.").
196. See e.g., Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 315 (the IACtHR
would be ruling this when stating that the protection of the unborn should only be gradual and
incremental).
197. See e.g. Gonzalo Candia, Comparing Diverse Approaches to the Margin of Appreciation:
The Case of the European and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 22 (Working Paper No. 1,
2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2406705 (last visited Oct. 28,
2014).
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States the capacity to give alternative interpretations to the ACHR. This
argument may be read as twofold. First, it may refer to the stage of
development of nations individually considered, in which case, its validity
and consequences would depend on the specific characteristics of the
relevant State. Hence, the IACtHR would be obliged to give specific
arguments to support a State's incapacity to reach a reasonable
understanding of a particular right. The IACtHR, however, does not engage
in such analyses, so this prong of the argument is not relevant to explaining
the IACtHR's behavior. Secondly, the argument of States' feeble
institutions can be understood as referring to the whole group of State
parties to the ACHR. This prong of the claim may be valid for rejecting the
use of regional consensus as a guide for deciding whether an open-ended or
unclearly defined term of the ACHR allows diverse legitimate
interpretations.
Undeniably, domestic legal consensus or disagreement within States of
the Americas is not necessarily a good instrument for determining whether
a right enshrined in the ACHR allows different interpretations. For
instance, even if half of the States in the Americas were to have an
inquisitive criminal proceeding with a mandatory secret stage, it would not
be appropriate to claim that such regulation is a legitimate interpretation of
Article 8(5) of the ACHR (which establishes that criminal proceedings must
be public, "except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of
justice"). Such a lack of consensus would not be an adequate indicator of
the need to grant the State a margin of appreciation. Most likely, not even
the ECtHR's utilizes regional consensus in that way.
The need to grant a margin of appreciation is not necessarily related to
consensus, but to the nature and formulation of the right. Nevertheless,
regional consensus may suggest the need to apply such a margin. There are
many issues in which the rules of the ACHR are broad, allowing diverse
legitimate interpretations in accordance with different national values. For
instance, if there are different reasonable scientific or sociological
hypotheses that may determine the interpretation of a particular right, the
IACtHR should probably defer to the State's interpretation. This would be
an application of the principle of subsidiarity.
C. The Principle ofSubsidiarity
According to a former President of the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, Paolo Carozza, a simplified definition of the principle of
subsidiarity could be "the principle that each social and political group
should help smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends
2014] PatVl 125
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without, however, arrogating those tasks to itself."' 98  This principle is
implicit in the Preamble of the ACHR and has been acknowledged by the
IACtHR on several occasions, 199 even though it has not always been
properly understood. 2 00  Recently the IACtHR equated the principle of
subsidiarity with that of complementarity, and has stated that it "crosscuts
the inter-American human rights system." 201  The IACtHR has understood
the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the Preamble of the ACHR,
by saying that its own jurisdiction reinforces and complements the
protection provided by domestic law, which means that the State is the
main guarantor of the human rights of persons.202 The IACtHR also
considered that there is a close relation between the principle of subsidiarity
and the "conventionality control" or "control of conformity with the
Convention." 2 03
The principle of subsidiarity has both a positive and a negative
dimension. This means that it generates an obligation to act and another to
abstain from acting.2 0 If the subsidiarity principle is applied to the
interpretation of the ACHR, the positive dimension will indicate that the
IACtHR must exercise its jurisdiction when domestic State bodies are
198. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, n.l (2003) [hereinafter Subsidiarity].
199. See e.g., Rios et al. v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 194,153 (Feb. 24, 2012); see also Atala-Riffo and Daughters
v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, 65 (P6rez-
P6rez, J., dissenting) (Feb. 24, 2012). Cf Protocol 15, supra note 188 (Protocol 15 to the European
Convention seeks to include this concept in this treaty's Preamble).
200. E.g., Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at TT 134-35 (the principle
was used for not referring to some of the State's arguments in relation to the negative effects of IVF in
the legal system, and in the health of women and their children, and regarding the cryoconservation of
embryos. The IACtHR ruled that it would limit itself to the controversies that had been dealt with by
the Constitutional Court when deciding on the unconstitutionality of the relevant executive order. The
IACtHR did this, in spite of the fact that these issues had been argued domestically, and of the direct
relation existing between these negatives effects and IVF. The determination of the relevance of
arguments is not necessarily germane to the principle of subsidiarity. It is related to the internal
reasoning process of the IACtHR, which should always respect the right to due process.).
201. Massacre of Santo Domingo v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, 142 (Nov. 30, 2012).
202. Id.; see also Garcia-Lucero et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objection, Merits and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 267, 1 133 (Aug. 28, 2013) (where the IACtHR understands
some of the consequences of the principle, by saying "in principle, it is for the domestic authorities to
determine the appropriateness of specific or precise measures in the context of the investigation").
203. Massacre of Santo Domingo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, at 142 (this
interpretation is, however, debatable).
204. Subsidiarity, supra note 198, at 44.
2014]
unable to interpret the ACHR in a reasonable fashion. The negative
dimension would mean that the IACtHR must abstain from acting when
domestic bodies have interpreted the ACHR in a way that is reasonable and
according to national reality. This is partly a consequence of the fact that
domestic State authorities are, in principle, better placed to interpret and
apply the ACHR to their national circumstances. For instance, they should
be better able to determine when a particular restriction of rights fulfills the
ACHR's requirement of being "necessary., 2 05  In relation to Artavia,
domestic bodies had already determined which kinds of threats to human
life were acceptable. In spite of this, the IACtHR decided to rule that IVF
had to be allowed and, furthermore, established several other consequences
of its rulings, such as the authorization of "heterologous" IVF.206 The latter
consequence was not at issue in this case and may strain national values and
domestic legal norms even further than the ruling would have done without
this additional stipulation.
X. REPARATIONS
The ACHR provides that, if there has been "a violation of a right or
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured
party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was
violated."2 07 In addition, it states that the IACtHR "shall also rule, if
appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that
constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party."208 In light of these provisions,
whenever violations are due to structural situations, the IACtHR
understands that it has the power to attempt to modify these structures, for
instance, by ordering the abrogation of laws, the amendment of
constitutions, or the performance of acts or proceedings that may aid in
mitigating their effects. Furthermore, the IACtHR has stated that its system
of reparations "must be designed" to change contexts of structural
209discrimination. In other words, the IACtHR considers that it has the duty
205. Cf PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 161-62
(3d ed. 2011).
206. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1 300 ("Moreover, women may
resort to IVF without the need for a partner.").
207. ACHR, supra note 4, at art. 63(1) (the phrase "protected by this Convention" is relevant
for some of the issues dealt previously in this paper, such as extra-Convention jurisdiction).
208. Id.
209. Gonzdlez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, at TT 450, 541 (the IACtHR ordering the
implementation of programs and training sessions directed to the elimination of stereotypes of women's
role in society).
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to define and demand specific solutions to structural problems that may be
difficult to delineate and tackle.
Of course, in some cases, simple compensation is not enough for
providing a suitable remedy to the victims. This could occur when the
applicant is undergoing an illegal deprivation of freedom. Solving
situations like this would be consistent with the IACtHR's power to remedy
"the consequences" of the relevant human rights violation. There is,
however, a big difference between noting the need for a tailored solution to
a particular case, and considering that the IACtHR should try to put an end
to structural societal problems. Indeed, it seems naive to believe that the
IACtHR's judges are capable of solving serious social problems that States
themselves are not able to solve, even when trying to combat them in good
faith, and in spite of having more means and specialized personnel than the
IACtHR for doing so. 2 10  In addition, the IACtHR may, at times, fail to
"bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy
measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant."2 1 1
Some of the reparations ordered in Artavia have already been
described. Among them, the implementation of awareness programs
(permanent training and educational programs and courses) is particularly
problematic. 212 This kind of reparation is always complex-regardless of
the matter it addresses-because it brings to memory the "official versions"
of some totalitarian regimes. In Artavia, however, this kind of remedy is
even more problematic, because the subject matter of this case is extremely
controversial. The IACtHR itself acknowledged that there is no single
opinion on this issue, and that it could not impose a single set of beliefs on
those who did not agree with them. Hence, the IACtHR should not have
mandated the implementation of awareness programs that reflect only one
of these positions.
210. Malarino analyzes some problems raised by the IACtHR's reparations system. He calls
them the supranationalisation of the IACtHR. The problems he identifies are mainly related to the
IACtHR's acting as the highest authority of States within the Inter-American system. Judicial Activism,
supra note 150, at 684-94.
211. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 63/117, at Art. 8(4), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CESCR/
OProtocol en.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (even though this quote is taken from a different treaty, it
is relevant because it reminds that there are many ways of achieving similar ends, so it could be
inadequate for the IACtHR to side with particular policies).
212. This form of reparation has received some criticisms. See e.g., Julio Alvear T61lez, La
Sentencia de la CIDH en el Caso Atala: Una Iniciativa para el Adoctrinamiento en Ideologias
Radicales. Notas Breves a la Sentencia del 24 de Febrero del 2012 [The IACtHR's Judgement on the
Atala Case: An Initiative for the Indoctrination ofRadical Ideologies. BriefNotes About the Decision of
February 24, 2012], 26 ACTUALUDAD JUR. 577 (2012).
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It is also worth commenting on the IACtHR's order that the Costa
Rican public health system should "make IVF available within its health
care infertility treatments and programs."2 13 This request is a way of
directly ordering the implementation of a social legal right. Such an
approach dismisses the existence of a specific Inter-American protocol
dealing with second generation human rights.2 14 In addition, when devising
this reparation, the IACtHR did not properly analyze Costa Rica's financial
resources. It neither considered the budgetary implications of its decision
in terms of the impact on different, potentially more pressing, matters on
which the State may have wished to expend public money. On the other
hand, the IACtHR itself noted that assisted reproduction treatments were
not included in the State health care programs of countries under its
jurisdiction, but that three States were "trying to take measures" to include
them.215 Considering that these three States, Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay, are among the richest countries in the region, it is puzzling to see
the IACtHR imposing such difficult standards. Last, but not least, the
IACtHR failed to ponder the theoretical and moral differences that exist
between tolerating an activity, and supporting it.
It is not particularly conscientious for an adjudicator to make specific
demands without having previously analyzed in detail each relevant
circumstance. The circumstances include the State's resources, national
values, legal system, etcetera. In fact, it is difficult to imagine another
international court ordering a remedy of this kind. Furthermore, the
question arises as to whether the IACtHR has the power to order these
specific nationwide socio-economic reparations. The extravagance of this
remedy is in no way lessened by ruling that its implementation should be
gradual. This is, among other reasons, because the IACtHR, itself, decides
during the phase of monitoring compliance whether the gradual
implementation is fast enough.
XI. CONCLUSION
This commentary sought to use the Artavia case to briefly outline
some common practices deployed by the IACtHR in its decision-making
process. Without trying to belittle the contributions that this court has made
to international law, it must be noted that its decision-making process
displays some peculiarities that give rise to some concerns. Among the
practices that this commentary analyzed are the application of instruments
213. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at T 338.
214. See Two Intertwined Treaties, supra note 101.
215. Artavia-Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 1 255 (emphasis added).
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other than the ACHR, the IACtHR's maximalist approach when
adjudicating, and some interpretive deficiencies. This commentary aims to
encourage further study of these practices so that scholars may propose
ways of improving the IACtHR's decision-making process.
Unfortunately, a number of practices of the IACtHR are veering it
away from the ACHR's text. This generates some legal uncertainty, and
prompts a decline in the system's prestige. Furthermore, some of these
effects have a negative impact on the IACtHR's legitimacy. This is
particularly serious for a court that claims to have broad powers and aims at
having its case law applied directly by domestic bodies (according to its
doctrine of the control of conformity with the Convention). The IACtHR's
decision-making process can be improved. One possible solution is to
examine the practices of the oldest regional human rights court, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), because some of its
proceedings can be used as models. The ECtHR has always been aware of
its own limitations, especially during its early years. This explains why it
adopted a much more self-controlled attitude than its counterpart in the
Americas.
It is never easy to make predictions. However, it is possible to foretell
that, unless the IACtHR changes some of its decision-making practices, the
number of States under its jurisdiction will steady or even fall.216 Decisions
such as Artavia, which misinterpret the ACHR on a matter that was not
even put to the IACtHR, tend to discredit the system in the eyes of a
significant portion of the Latin-American population. So far States have
not complained much in relation to the decision making process of the
IACtHR (most criticisms have been due to some States' reluctance to fulfill
the ACHR's requirements). The reason explaining the few complaints
regarding the decision-making process of the IACtHR, may be a certain
degree of ignorance about the way the Court operates. Other reasons could
be that the IACtHR had not yet entered fully into the creation of rights in
controversial areas, or that governments are not widely perceived as having
the moral authority required for raising objections. Be that as it may, the
IACtHR could be stretching too far the States willingness to agree with its
rulings. Hence, it would be advisable for it to modify its decision-making
practices. Unfortunately, some of them are so deeply ingrained that the
IACtHR may not change them unless there is an amendment of the relevant
procedural and interpretive legal provisions.
216. Probably the sole exception to this will be the case of Venezuela, which may decide to
resubmit itself to the IACtHR once the Chavista era is over.
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